J.C.S. 1924/101

. 12 March 1958

Pages 1390 - 1398, incl.

REPORT BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (IRBMS) (U)

DECLASSIFIED RY:
DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
JOS DECLASSIFICATION
DATE
15 May 1979

Withdrawn from consideration See n. to H., dated 17 war 58 DEPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (IRBMS) (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider the Soviet (probable) reaction to U. S.	, 1
deployments of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's)	2
in Western Europe.	3

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The Joint Chief's of Staff Girected* the Joint Intelligence	4
Committee to submit for their consideration an appreciation of	5
the Soviet reaction to U. S. deployments of IRBM's in Western	6
Europe.	7

DISCUSSION

3. This	subject :	involves	the full	l gamut	of internat	tional	3
relations.	It is no	cessary	to estir	mate the	probable a	actions	9
and reacti	ons which	the depl	oyment o	of U.S.	IRBM's may	stimulate.	10

CONCLUSION

4. 10	13	concluded 5	nat	apı	preciation	1 OI	the	subject	is best	11
achieved	ру	preparation	of	an	ESTIMATE	whic	h is	hereby	submitted	12
as an End	108	sure.								13

RECOMMENDATIONS

		•	Τť	18	recommended	tnat	tne	10372	Chieis	OI	Stall	note	14
t	he	er	nclo	sec	ESTIMATE.								15

	6.	It	is	recommended	that	this	report	not	bе	distributed	16
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^{*} SM-362-57, dated 6 December 1957

SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE

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Europe.						7

DISCUSSION

3. This subject involves the full gamut of international relations. It is necessary to estimate the probable actions and reactions which the deployment of U. S. IRBM's may stimulate. 10

CONCLUSION

4. It is concluded that appreciation of the subject is best achieved by preparation of an ESTIMATE which is hereby submitted 12 13 as an Enclosure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 5. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note 14 15 the enclosed ESTIMATE.
- 16 6. It is recommended that this report not be distributed 17 to commanders of unified or specified commands.

* SM-362-57, dated 6 December 1957



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JOINT INTERLIGENCE CONSIDERE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO U. S. DEPLOYMENT OF IRBMS IN WESTERN EUROPE

THE PROBLEM	
1. To estimate probable Soviet reactions to United States	1
deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's)	2
in Western Europe.	3
SCOPE NOTE	
2. This estimate considers the period from 1958 through	4
1962.	5
3. It does not consider the effect upon non-Sino-Soviet	6
Bloc countries of U. S. deployment of IRBM's in Western Europe.	7
4. It does not consider the problems or difficulties of	S
successfully negotiating the bilateral agreements necessary	9
for the deployment of U.S. IRBM's in the various countries	10
of Western Europe.	11
5. It does not consider probable Soviet reactions to a	12
transfer of custody and control of U. S. IRBM's, including	13
nuclear components, to nations of Western Europe.	14
<u>ASSUMPTION</u>	
6. It is assumed that the United States has successfully	15
negotiated the agreements necessary for such deployment.	16
APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM	

as follows:	20
pertinent to examine the problem in terms of several question	s 19
intelligence estimates for the period 1958 through 1962 it is	18
1. As a basis for discussion and in consideration of curre	nt 17

To the property of the post of	-
significance of such deployment?	2
b. From the Soviet viewpoint what would be the military	3
significance of such deployment?	4
BACKGROUND	
S. Last spring in a series of communications the Soviets	5
pointed out to certain NATO countries that their cooperation	6
in U. S. deployment of nuclear weapon systems could lead to	7
their involvement in a nuclear war.	8
9. Just prior to the December NATO conference the Soviets	9
sent additional notes to MATO states reiterating the dangers	10
to them which are inherent in United States deployment of	11
nuclear and rocket weapons on their territories.	12
10. More recently the Soviets have proposed another "Summit	13
Meeting". In addition they specifically have proposed again	14
a "neutral zone" in Western Europe, suspension of nuclear tests	, 15
and a nonaggression agreement between the NATO and the Warsaw	16
Pact nations. Their propaganda has also been directed	17
at the Baghdad Pact nations concerning the consequences of	18
permitting Western nations to establish military bases and	19
to deploy nuclear weapons in that area.	20
11. The present Soviet propaganda line as reflected in the	21
numerous notes sent to various nations has the following genera	122
themes with minor variations tailored to the specific condition	18 23
of each country:	24
a. To attack the "interdependence thesis" of NATO;	25
that is, that the smaller nations are relinquishing their	26
sovereignty.	27
b. To play on the fears of nuclear devastation among	2 8
the peoples of Western countries.	29
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


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the peoples of Western countries.

Enclosure

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c. To create the specter of a rearmed definally securing	-
into motion forces not anticipated by the NATO participants.	5
d. To explode the "myth" of U. S. military supremacy.	3
e. To point out the dangers of commitments that would	4
involve them in conflicts over issues not vital to their	5
interests.	6
$\underline{\mathbf{f}}_{ullet}$. To stress the Soviet theme of peaceful coexistence.	7
12. Public confidence of the NATO and other Allied nations	8
in the technological superiority of the United States has	9
been shaken by the USSR's successful launching of two earth	10
satellites and by the evident Soviet successes in the nuclear	11
and missile fields.	12
DISCUSSION	.10
13. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has for a number of years been	13
faced with military encirclement and the threat of certain	14
nuclear retaliation to Sino-Soviet military aggression against	15
the U. S. or its Allies. In addition the leaders of the Sino-	16
Soviet Bloc almost certainly attribute a nuclear capability	17
to United States combat forces deployed overseas. This	18
situation and our judgement of the military, political and	19
economic capabilities which the Soviets now possess and may	20
further develop throughout the period is the basis for our	21
estimate that general war is unlikely.	22
	23
From the Soviet point of view, what would be the	24
political significance of United States deployment of IRBM's	
to Western Europe?	25
14. Assuming that the United States had successfully	26
negotiated the agreements necessary for deployment of IRBM's	27
in Western Europe, from the Soviet viewpoint, it would mean	2
	29
that:	

ā. The underlying philosophy of NATO had prevailed.	1
b. Conversely, Soviet efforts to achieve their	2
objectives in the NATO area, that is to weaken the	3
cohesion of the alliance and to force withdrawal of	4
U. S. military power, had at least temporarily failed	5
or suffered a reversal.	6
$\underline{\mathbf{c}}_{ullet}$ The West was visibly demonstrating its cohesion	7
and willing cooperation to present a unified front in	8
opposition to Soviet objectives.	9
15. Within the Satellites mixed views would prevail and	10
vary from the extreme of increased psychological fears of	11
their inevitable destruction to the view that increased	12
pressure on the Soviets would result in their eventual	13
liberation.	14
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of action will continue to be forbidding.

12. Public confidence of the NATO and other Allied nat	ions 8
in the technological superiority of the United States has	9
been shaken by the USSR's successful launching of two ear	th 10
satellites and by the evident Soviet successes in the nuc	lear 11
and missile fields.	12

DISCUSSION

13. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has for a number of years been 13 faced with military encirclement and the threat of certain 14 15 nuclear retaliation to Sino-Soviet military aggression against 16 the U. S. or its Allies. In addition the leaders of the Sino-Soviet Bloc almost certainly attribute a nuclear capability 17 18 to United States combat forces deployed overseas. 19 situation and our judgement of the military, political and 50 economic capabilities which the Soviets now possess and may further develop throughout the period is the basis for our 21 22 estimate that general war is unlikely.

From the Soviet point of view, what would be the 23
political significance of United States deployment of IRBM's 24
to Western Europe? 25

14. Assuming that the United States had successfully 26 negotiated the agreements necessary for deployment of IRBM's 27 in Western Europe, from the Soviet viewpoint, it would mean 25 that:



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and willing cooperation to present a unified front in	8
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throughout the period. The development of significant Allied	19
ballistic missile capabilities will create a threat against	20
which there is little or no chance of the Soviets developing	2:
an effective defense by 1362. Hence from the Soviet point	22
of view, they already face a forbidding situation which with	2
the advent of ballistic missiles, wherever deployed, will	2
become increasingly unfavorable and general war as a course	2
of action will continue to be forbidding.	2

17. From the Soviet military viewpoint, deployment of U.S.	7
IREM's in Western Europe prior to the development of a significant	2
U. S. ICBM capability therefore will tend to present to them	3
the threat of ballistic missiles earlier in the period of the	4
estimate. Further such deployment would tend to counterbalance	5
any advantage they may have or may hope to achieve in the	б
development of ballistic missiles.	7
	0

18. Specifically, such deployment would, from the Soviet

viewpoint have two aspects:

a. The change in the degree of threat to Soviet security 10

inherent in the threat of ballistic missiles, and

b. Of equal or perhaps greater military significance,
the increase in the threat to Soviet security by deployment
of U. S. IRBM's to areas of Western Europe which do not at
the present time pose a direct military threat because of
the lack of significant Allied or U. S. military power.
Such deployment would markedly increase the threat and
further limit Soviet initiative and flexibility.

THE ESTIMATE OF SOVIET REACTIONS

19. Having failed to prevent the successful negotiation of 19 bilateral agreements necessary for the deployment of U. S. IRBM's 20 to Western Europe, the Soviets in their realistic manner and 21 recognition of the implications might perversely welcome the 22 propaganda benefits offered by such deployment. 23

20. It is certain that the Soviets would exploit every 24 propaganda opportunity, with variations tailored to the specific 25 conditions of each country, in order to delay and forestall 26 the actual deployment of IRBM's. They would attempt to increase 27 the difficulties of such deployments by such means as inciting 26 local civil disturbances, public meetings, strikes and in some 29 instances possibly attempting sabotage of facilities. 30

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war.	3
22. Specifically, it would be the Soviet purpose to drive	71
home the contention that Western moves had increased	5
tensions and the risk of general war. They might step	б
up pressure on the Western position in Berlin, using the GDR	7
as their stalking horse.	3
23. The USSR might feel it advisable to counterbalance this	9
military threat by an apparent strengthening of the Warsaw	10

21. The Soviets would not, however, take any action which

in their judgement would seriously incur the risk of general

military threat by an apparent strengthening of the Warsaw 10 Pact even to the extent of implying that Satellite forces 11 are equipped with nuclear weapons. However, this would 12 increase their own difficulties of control and it is considered 13 more likely that the Soviets would attempt to exploit their 14 propaganda of "peaceful intentions" and not provide Satellite 15 forces with nuclear weapons. 16

24. It is almost certain that Soviet forces in the Satellites 17 would be equipped with nuclear weapons. However, in view of 18 geographic and security factors it is unlikely that this would 19 include deployment of IRBM's within the Satellites. This does 20 not preclude the possibility that the Soviets would announce 21 or imply for propaganda purposes that they had deployed IRBM's 22 within certain of the Satellites. 23


25. In addition, the over-all implications of the continued 24 strength and cohesion of NATO might cause the Soviets to 25 withhold any contemplated liberalization and relaxation of 26 control within the Satellites, recognizing that such a policy 27 might be interpreted as a Soviet weakness in response to Western 28 pressures and therefore as inviting more venturesome actions 29



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5360	Within the Satellites. Suon a reasonou map	
	within the USSR itself and lead to a general hardening of	2
	Party control. As a corollary, this could lead to a reduction	-
	of cultural, scientific-technical, and economic international	1
	exchanges.	
	26. Finally, it is estimated that the Soviets might stimulate	
	or incite local disturbances or incidents in the Middle and	. (
	Far East in an attempt to divert Allied and particularly the	ì
	U. S. effort from Western Europe.	-
	CONCLUSIONS	
	27. The Soviets will recognize, in their realistic fashion,	10
	that U. S. deployment of IRBM's to Western Europe would	1:
	essentially do nothing more from the military viewpoint than	12
	aggravate a situation which already makes general war a	13
	prohibitive course of action for them to pursue during the	12
	period of this estimate.	15
	28. Their "thesis - anti-thesis" process of thought will	16
	probably lead them to a conclusion that such deployment affords	17
	them an excellent propaganda opportunity which they will	18
	probably exploit to maximum advantage.	19
	29. If the Soviets fail by propaganda measures and creation	20
	of unfavorable public opinion to prevent the actual deployment	21
	of U. S. IRBM'sto Western Europe, it is estimated that their	22
	reactions probably will lead to a hardening of attitude on an	23
	international basis and a strengthening of Communist control	21
	within the Catallites and the MCCD	25

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30. The Soviets will not, however, as the result of such

deployment resort to actions which in their judgement would

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Enclosure

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